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Abstract: This paper presents estimates of lost movie sales due to unpaid movie consumption. We are the
first to provide estimates that are recent, representative of the internet-using population, and cover multiple
countries. Based on an online questionnaire with almost 30,000 respondents, we document that one unpaid
(first) viewing of a movie displaces about 0.37 units of paid viewings. Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation,
we show that this implies that unpaid movie viewings reduced movie sales in Europe by about 4.4% during
the sample period. Lost sales differ substantially by country: they are in the range of 1.65% for Germany and
10.4% for Spain. We also find that 94% of lost sales are due to unpaid viewings by a small group of only 20% of
consumers. Our findings have important implications for copyright policy.
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11 Introduction
Unpaid movie consumption is widespread in Europe. According to a 2014 study, nearly 70% of Europeans
report to download or stream films “for free.”1 To what extent such unpaid consumption reduces movie sales
is difficult to quantify. One might argue that if a movie was not available “for free” the consumer would pay
for it instead; one unpaid viewing would then displace one paid viewing. However, this only holds if the
consumer’s willingness to pay for that movie was at least as high as its market price. For consumers with a
willingness to pay below the market price sales displacement would be zero. It is therefore likely that at least a
share of individuals who saw a given movie “for free” would have never bought that movie in the first place.
The size of the so-called “displacement rate” is therefore ultimately an empirical question.
Estimates of the displacement rate in the existing literature suffer from several problems. Firstly, studies
are usually based on “convenience samples” that are not representative of the population and are therefore of
only limited use for policy makers. Secondly, there is a lack of studies that cover multiple countries. Thirdly,
there are few studies that use recent data. Recent evidence, however, is essential since both the legal and illegal
consumption of copyrighted content changed substantially in the last years, particularly due to the emergence
of streaming services. Finally, while there are many studies on the displacement rate for music, evidence for
movies is scarce. This paper aims to fill this void in the literature by providing estimates of the displacement
rate for audiovisual content that are recent, representative of the internet-using population, and cover multiple
countries.
We use a big online questionnaire of almost 30,000 individuals in six major European countries to empirically
assess the displacement rate for movies and to quantify lost movie sales due to unpaid consumption in Europe.
Respondents were given a list of 100 popular movies and asked to, firstly, select the movies they had seen, and
secondly, to state how they had seen a given movie: e.g., in the cinema, by a legal stream, or by downloading
it from a file-sharing or hosting site (unpaid consumption). Since a movie can be watched more than once,
one unpaid movie viewing can theoretically even displace more than one movie sale. We therefore also ask
respondents whether they saw a movie more than once.
A naive approach to quantify the displacement rate would be to ask whether respondents who report more
unpaid viewings have fewer paid viewings. A well known problem of this approach is that individuals are
likely to differ concerning their taste for movies. Individuals with a relatively high preference for movies
probably engage in both more paid and unpaid consumption. Unless these differences in the taste for music
can be controlled for, this will result in an underestimation of the rate of displacement due to omitted variable
bias.
1European Commission (2014)
2In this paper, we follow Rob and Waldfogel (2007) to address this problem by using a longitudinal approach.
The movies that are shown in the survey to respondents have been released either in 2011, 2012, or 2013. Under
the assumption that paid or unpaid consumption of a movie primarily took place in the year of release, we can
use this data to build a quasi-panel of movie consumption. Since this panel has information on an individual’s
movie consumption over several years, we can account for unobserved differences in the taste for movies by
using individual fixed effects.
This paper puts forward three main findings. Firstly, using a sample that is representative of the internet-
using population in six major European countries, we find that one unit of first unpaid consumption on average
displaces around 0.42 units of first paid consumption. Interestingly, for movies that a respondent reports to
have seen at least twice, we find evidence of a small “sampling effect:” one unit of first unpaid consumption
increases second paid consumption by about 0.04 units. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on these
estimates implies that unpaid movie consumption accounts for a reduction of movie sales by about 4.4% during
our sample period. Secondly, we find that displacement rates are quite similar across the six countries we study.
However, because unpaid consumption is much more prevalent in some countries than in others, lost movie
sales nevertheless differ substantially: lost sales range between 2% for Germany and 11% for Spain. Thirdly,
we document large differences across individuals. While 10% of individuals report not to have consumed any
movies, 20% of the interviewees are responsible for 52% of total movies seen. These top movie consumers also
have a substantially higher displacement rate: only 20% of individuals are responsible for about 96% of total
lost movie sales. Particularly the last finding is informative for copyright policy. It shows that approaches
that focus on a certain group of consumers will be potentially much more effective than, for example, general
awareness campaigns.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the related
literature. In Section 3 we present the questionnaire and show some descriptive statistics. In Section 4 we
describes the estimation framework. Estimates of the displacement rates and of lost movie sales are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses implications for copyright policy.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to a literature that analyzes the effect of unpaid consumption of music on record sales
and that faces similar methodological challenges.2 As for movies, individuals with a strong interest in music
are more likely to have both high paid and unpaid consumption. In a simple regression framework, the
displacement rate would therefore be underestimated.
2We refer the reader to Liebowitz (2006a,b) and Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2010) for survey articles.
3One way to address this identification problem is to use an instrumental variable approach. Rob and
Waldfogel (2006) use access to broadband as a source of exogenous variation for unpaid music consumption.
For a sample of 412 students at four U.S. colleges they find that one additional (unpaid) download decreases
sales modestly by between 0.1 and 0.2 units, reducing purchases per capita by about 10% during 2003. In
line with this “incomplete displacement” finding, their survey also shows that respondents downloaded music
that they valued relatively less and would not otherwise have purchased, implying that illegal downloading
led to some socially beneficial transactions. Similarly, based on a big sample of 15,000 Europeans from the
year 2001, Zentner (2006) uses the speed of a respondent’s internet connection and his internet sophistication
as instruments for “regularly downloading MP3 files.” He finds that downloading MP3 files reduces the
probability of buying music during the month prior to the survey by 30 percent. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation implies that without downloading music record sales in 2002 would have been 7.8 percent higher.
Another strand of literature exploits natural experiments for identification. Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf
(2007) analyze the impact of album downloads from file-sharing networks on album sales. They establish
causality by instrumenting for the supply of music for download by using data on international school holidays.
They find that file-sharing has an effect record sales that is indistinguishable from zero. In a more recent study,
Hong (2013) analyzes the effect that the introduction of Napster – a peer-to-peer network – had on household
expenditures on recorded music. He finds that file sharing is likely to explain 20% of the sales decline in
recorded music during the Napster period.
The literature that analyzes the effect of unpaid movie consumption is smaller but results are equally mixed.
Danaher and Smith (2014) analyze the effect the U.S. government shutdown of Megaupload.com – a major website
used for watching illegal content – had on movie sales. For identification, they exploit cross-country variation
in the pre-shutdown usage of Megaupload.com in a difference-in-difference approach. They find that digital
revenues for three major motion picture studios increased by between 6.5% and 8.5%.
The article that is most related to ours is Rob and Waldfogel (2007). The authors propose a novel longitudinal
approach based on an individual’s movie consumption by vintage to address the endogeneity problem discussed
above. We follow the same approach in the present paper. Unlike most of the other literature, Rob and Waldfogel
(2007) also take into account the possibility that a movie can be seen more than once, allowing for a displacement
rate than in theory can be even higher than one-to-one. For a sample of 454 U.S. college students, they find a
displacement rate of one: one unit of unpaid (first) consumption displaced one unit of paid consumption.
Bai and Waldfogel (2012) apply the same methodology to, firstly, a sample of 372 Chinese college students,
and secondly, a sample of 3852 Chinese internet users. Interestingly, results differ substantially from Rob and
Waldfogel (2007). Firstly, movie piracy is more widespread. In both samples, unpaid consumption amounts
4to about three quarters of total movie consumption compared to 5% for the sample of U.S. college students
in Rob and Waldfogel (2007). Secondly, the estimated displacement rate is between 0 and -0.14 and therefore
much smaller than the one-to-one displacement effect found in Rob and Waldfogel (2007). In spite of large
volumes of unpaid movie consumption, these results imply small damages from movie piracy in China. This
big discrepancy between the results for the U.S. and China despite using a consistent methodology make clear
that, firstly, there is still a lot of uncertainty when it comes to quantifying lost sales due to movie piracy, and
secondly, that effects can vary substantially across countries.
The present paper adds to the literature in several ways. Firstly, while existing studies are based on “con-
venience samples,” we are the first to provide evidence that is representative of the internet-using population.
Importantly, our relatively big sample also allows us to compare movie piracy behavior across different demo-
graphic groups. Secondly, our study covers multiple countries using an identical methodology. This allows for
potentially interesting cultural and legal insights, especially given the drastically different results reported for
the US and China by Rob and Waldfogel (2007) and Bai and Waldfogel (2012). Finally, our study is based on
recent data and takes into account the rise of streaming servivces in the last years. Online streaming made the
consumption of both legal and illegal content more convenient and therefore might have substantially affected
the displacement rate.
3 Data
3.1 Online questionnaire
This paper builds on data from an online questionnaire that was conducted in September and October 2014.3
A total of 28,344 individuals from Germany, France, Spain, Poland, Sweden, and the UK were successfully
interviewed concerning their movie consumption behavior.
Respondents were shown a list of 100 top box office movies. Out of these 100 movies, 30 were released in the
year 2011, 35 in 2012, and another 35 in 2013.4 From this list, respondents were asked to select all movies they
had seen. In a second step, they were asked to report how they saw a given movie the first and – for movies
seen more than once – the second time they saw it:5 i) in the cinema, ii) by legal download, streaming or video, iii)
on DVD or Blu-Ray disk, iv) via a file-sharing or hosting site, or v) on TV (pay or free broadcast) or airplane. In the
following, we refer to “unpaid” consumption as movies seen using option iv) while “paid” consumption refers
3The data was collected by Ecorys as commissioned by the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and
SMEs of the European Commission.
4The exact list of 100 movies shown to interviewees differed by country. In each country, the top box office movies released in 2011,
2012, and 2013 were shown.
5Since the questionnaire would have been too long otherwise, respondents who indicated to have seen more than 20 movies were
only asked to indicate the mode of consumption for 20 randomly selected movies.
5to movies seen using option i), ii), iii), or v).
In addition, respondents were asked about their sex, age, their education, and whether they worked. More-
over, respondents were asked to indicate whether their interest in films and series was much lower, lower, same,
higher, much higher compared to other people.
We apply weights to the raw data to make the sample representative of the internet using population. Using
data from Eurostat, we first calculate the internet using population6 for each of 6× 2× 10 = 120 country-by-sex-
by-age category cells. Weights are then obtained as the ratio of the share of the population versus the share of
respondents in a given cell.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the respondents’ characteristic data. Descriptive statistics on movie consumption are shown
in Table 2. On average, individuals indicated to have seen 16.88 movies of the list of 100 top movies of which
1.969 – about 11.6% – were seen without paying for it. On average, only 4.42 movies – about 26% of movies
seen – are reported to have been seen (at least) twice. That is, 74% are first viewings. This number is very close
to the 78% of first viewings found by Rob and Waldfogel (2007). The ratio of unpaid to total consumption is
very similar for second and first viewings. Columns (3) to (14) of Table 2 documents summary statistics by
country. While there are modest differences in the average number of movies seen – it is in the range of 14.07
in Germany and 20.83 in Spain – unpaid movie consumption differs much more: average consumption ranges
from 0.64 in Germany to almost seven times that number in Spain.
Table 3 reports statistics on the second consumption of a movie (rows) conditional on first consumption
(columns). Firstly, the table confirms that only about 25% of movies are seen (at least) twice. Secondly, if a
movie has been paid for at first consumption, second consumption is usually also paid; only about 7% of second
viewings are unpaid ( 1.925.23 ). Thirdly, a surprising finding is that unpaid first consumption is often followed by
paid second consumption. For movies that have been seen twice and where consumption was not paid for on
the first view, about 50% of second viewings ( 12.0623.41 ) were paid for. This can be seen as evidence for a “sampling
effect.” According to Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) sampling reveals product quality and helps consumers to
make informed purchasing decisions. That is, consumers might use unpaid downloads to find out whether
they actually like a movie and then buy this movie on DVD or see it in the cinema. Through this channel,
unpaid consumption might actually stimulate movie sales.
Finally, Figure 1 documents that there are substantial differences in movie consumption across individuals.
While almost 10% report not to have seen any of the listed movies, 20% of respondents are responsible for 52.4%
6We use the share of the population that has used the internet in the last 12 months based on the Eurostat table isoc ci ifp iu.
6of all viewings (241,647 of 460,825).
4 Estimation Strategy
The objective is to estimate the link between unpaid and paid movie consumption. The most simple approach is
to ask whether respondents who report more unpaid viewings have fewer paid viewings. A simple regression
framework is given by
paid1sti = α + β unpaid
1st
i + i (1)
where paid1sti and unpaid
1st
i are the number of (first) paid and unpaid viewings by individual i. The displacement
rate is given by the coefficient estimate β̂. A problem with this specification is that individuals differ concerning
their taste for watching movies. Since an individual who enjoys relatively more to watch movies is also likely
to engage in more paid consumption, the error-term can be written as i = φi + ei where φi is the individual
i’s (unobserved) taste for watching movies. Since a higher φi is also likely to lead to more instances of unpaid
movie consumption, unpaidi and the error term will be positively correlated, corr(unpaidi, i) > 0, resulting in β̂
to be upward biased.
There are three different approaches to address this issue. Firstly, given that an instrumental variable is
available that is strongly correlated with unpaid1sti but not correlated with the error term i, one can obtain an
unbiased estimate of β by relying on two-stage least squares. As discussed in Section 2, some earlier papers use
this approach with some success. Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and Zentner (2006), for example, use broadband
access and internet sophistication as instruments for illegal (music) consumption.
Unfortunately, it is nowadays more difficult to find good instruments for illegitimate consumption of copy-
righted material. In the last years streaming has become a popular way of legal consumption of movies (e.g., in
the 1st quarter of 2016, Netflix was present in more than 190 countries). For recent data, an instrument based
on broadband access would therefore violate the exclusion restriction since it would most likely affect paid
movie consumption directly, and not only through unpaid movie consumption. Similarly, due to the rise of
illegal streaming sites instead of peer-to-peer software (e.g., Napster), illegal downloading became more “user
friendly.” Internet sophistication is therefore probably not a valid instrument anymore.
A second approach is to add control variables to the regression that capture (at least some of) the variation
in the interest for music across individuals. As discussed in Section 2.1, the online questionnaire this study is
based on explicitly asks respondents about their interest interest in films. We can therefore extend regression
7equation (1) as follows:
paid1sti = α + β unpaid
1st
i + γ interest f ilmsi + δ controlsi + i. (2)
interest f ilmsi represents a set of dummy-variables that capture an individual’s relative taste for films and
series on a scale from 1 (“much lower”) to 5 (“much higher”). The vector controlsi captures individual-specific
demographic control variables: 5 education dummies, 10 age-category dummies, a female-dummy, 6 country
dummies, and a dummy that captures whether a person is currently working or not.
A problem of this approach is that we can only account for observable differences in the taste for films that are
actually reported in the questionnaire. If taste for seeing movies is varying in ways not captured by the set of
dummy-variables interest f ilmsi, however, then the estimated coefficient β̂ will remain upward biased, that is,
the rate of displacement will be underestimated.
We follow Rob and Waldfogel (2007) and address this problem by using a longitudinal approach. As explained
in Section 2, for each movie we know not only whether and how an individual consumed it but also whether
the movie was released in 2011, 2012, or 2013. Under the assumption that the paid or unpaid consumption of
a movie mostly occurred directly after a movie was released, we can use this information to construct a data
set of individual i’s paid and unpaid movie consumption by year. This quasi-panel then allows us to use panel
data methods and to estimate individual fixed effects µi.
Let paid1stiy and unpaid
1st
iy be individual i’s paid and unpaid (first) movie viewings in year 2011, 2012, or 2013.
Since we now have multiple observations for each individual, we can estimate the relation between paid and
unpaid movie consumption from within-individual variation in movie consumption. The basic regression
equation is given by
paid1stiy = α + β unpaid
1st
iy + µi + θy + iy (3)
where θy and µi account for vintage and individual fixed effects. Since individual fixed effects will account for
all observed and unobserved individual differences as long as these are constant over time, the displacement
rate given by the coefficient estimate β̂ should no longer be underestimated. The vintage fixed effectfs θy
account for the possibility that paid consumption might be systematically higher for some vintages than for
others. For example, it might be that individuals are more likely to remember to have seen more recent movies.
The same approach can be used to assess the effect of (first and second) unpaid movie consumption on second
paid consumption
8paid2ndiy = φ + κ unpaid
1st
iy + λ unpaid
2nd
iy + µi + θy + ηiy. (4)
That is, we estimate three different displacement rates: the effect of first unpaid consumption on first paid and
second paid consumption (β and κ), and the effect of second unpaid consumption on second paid consumption
(λ).
5 Results
5.1 Cross-sectional approach
Table 4 reports results using the cross-sectional approach. All regressions include controls for the respondent’s
interest in movies and other characteristics (age, education etc.) as well as country fixed effects. Column
(1) shows that one unit of (first) unpaid consumption displaces about 0.28 units of (first) paid consumption.
Columns (2) to (5) show disaggregated estimates by medium of consumption. The displacement rates we
report here are substantially bigger in absolute value than what Rob and Waldfogel (2007) find using a similar
cross-sectional approach (see Table 3 in their paper). It is also noteworthy that the estimated coefficients on the
interest in films dummies are reasonable. According to column (1), in our sample an individual with much higher
relative interest in films consumed about 16.5 more paid movies than individuals with much lower interest. We
also find that we obtain much smaller coefficients (in absolute value) when not controlling for the respondent’s
interest in movies.7 This is in line with the hypothesis described in Section 3 that differences in taste for movies
imply an underestimation of the rate of displacement.
Columns (6) to (10) report the results when the number of paid second viewings is regressed on unpaid
first and second viewings. The effect of unpaid first viewings is negative for all types of consumption. To the
contrary, similar to what Rob and Waldfogel (2007) document in their Table 3, unpaid second viewings are
estimated to have a positive effect.
When interpreted in a causal way, one unit of unpaid consumption decreases paid consumption by a total
of 0.34 units (=-0.281-0.0566). On the other hand, each second-time unpaid viewing increases paid viewings
by 0.169 units. As discussed in detail in Section 4, however, it is very likely that these simple cross-sectional
results are subject to a bias.
7These regression results are available upon request.
95.2 Longitudinal approach
Table 5 reports results using the more appropriate longitudinal approach.8 Column (1) shows that one unpaid
(first) view of a movie displaces about 0.42 paid (first) viewings. In absolute value, this estimate is about 50%
larger than the one in the comparable cross-sectional regression shown in column (1) of Table 4. This is in line
with the hypothesis that there exist unobservable differences in taste that are neither captured by the individual
controls nor by the set of dummy-variables interest musici and lead to biased estimates. Column (2) to (5)
disentangle the effect for different types of paid consumption. The biggest share of reduced paid viewings is
due to fewer visits to the movie theater.
Columns (6) to (10) show the effect on second paid movie viewings based on regression equation (4). Firstly,
we find that one unit of second unpaid consumption replaces about 0.22 units of second paid consumption.
More interestingly, however, one unit of first unpaid consumption leads to a small increase of about 0.05 second
paid viewings. As mentioned in Section 3.2, this is evidence in favor of a “sampling effect.”
The estimates in Table 5 imply that one unpaid movie viewing reduces paid viewings by 0.37 units (=-
0.419+0.0457). Each second-time unpaid viewing decreases paid viewings by 0.22 units. These displacement
rates lie in between the finding of no displacement for Chinese internet users (Bai and Waldfogel, 2012) and the
the one-to-one rate of displacement found for a sample of U.S. college students (Rob and Waldfogel, 2007).
5.2.1 Results by country
Table 6 reports results based on the longitudinal approach by country. Columns (1) to (6) show that regarding
first viewings displacement rates are relatively homogeneous across countries: the estimates are between 0.39
(Sweden) and 0.53 (Spain). Column (7) reports an alternative specification where all observations are included
in the regression but we allow for the effect of unpaidiy to vary by country. Using this specification, we can
formally test whether displacement rates differ across countries. We find that – with Germany as the baseline –
displacement rates are only significantly different for Spain (higher in absolute value). There is no statistically
significant difference for and France, UK, Poland, and Sweden.
Columns (8) to (14) show that the displacement rate for second paid viewings is also quite homogeneous
across countries. The aforementioned sampling effect is small for all countries and for Germany and Sweden
not even significantly different from zero. The displacement effect of second unpaid viewings on second paid
viewings is between -0.13 and -0.39.
8Note that due to the panel structure of the data we now have three observations for each individual: movie consumption in 2011,
2012, and 2013. The total number of observations used in the regressions are therefore three times higher than in the cross-sectional
approach in Table 4.
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5.2.2 Differences across individuals
As described in detail in Section 3, there is a lot of individual heterogeneity in the data with regard to overall
movie consumption. As documented Figure 1, 20% of individuals in the sample alone are responsible for 52%
of total movies seen. Here we show evidence that respondents who consume a lot of movies therefore seem to
have stronger tendency to substitute paid with unpaid consumption.
Table 7 reports estimates when individuals are grouped by quintiles according to their overall move con-
sumption. Column (1) and (2) document that for the bottom 80% of respondents, the displacement for first paid
viewings is about -0.15 while it is -0.57 for respondents in the top 20%.
Columns (3) and (4) shows that a similar pattern exists for second paid consumption. Firstly, there is evidence
of a sampling effect for individuals in the first four quintiles. One unit more unpaid first consumption leads
to an increase of paid second consumption by 0.11 units. There is no evidence of such an effect for consumers
in the top quintile. Moreover, for respondents in the 5th quintile second unpaid viewings displace more than
twice as many second paid viewings than for respondents in the 1st to 4th quintile.
5.3 Lost sales
The estimates of the displacement rates can now be used for a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the sales
lost due to unpaid consumption of movies. Table 8 shows estimated lost movie sales for the whole sample, by
country, and by total movie consumption. Columns (1) to (4) shows the number of paid and unpaid first and
second movie viewings. Columns (5) to (7) report the estimated displacement rates for first unpaid viewings
on first and second paid viewings (β and λ in regression equations (3) and (4)) and for second unpaid viewings
on second paid viewings (κ in regression equation (4)) based on regression equations (3) and (4). Column
(8) reports the counterfactual additional units of paid consumption in the absence of unpaid consumption
calculated as β× unpaid1stiy + κ× unpaid1stiy + λ× unpaid2ndiy . The counterfactual total paid consumption in column
(9) is then defined as the sum of columns (1) and (8). The lost sales in column (10) is the ratio of column (8) and
(9).
In the whole sample, 55810.9 unpaid first viewings displaced -20834.2 paid viewings (−0.419 × 55810.9 +
0.0457 × 55810.9).9 15496.8 second unpaid viewings displaced -3435.7 paid viewings (−0.2217 × 15496.8). In
total, 25269.9 paid viewings were displaced, a 4.38% loss of sales.
Table 8 also documents that lost sales due to unpaid consumption vary substantially across countries. While
in Germany lost sales due to unpaid consumption amount to 1.65%, in Spain this figure is 10.41%. As discussed
in Section 5.2.1, displacement rates are relatively homogeneous across countries. The big differences in lost
9The number of viewings can be non-integers since weights are applied as described in Section 3.1.
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sales are primarily driven by the substantial differences in paid vs. unpaid consumption in different member
states documented in Table 2.
The table also shows that lost sales differ very substantially across individuals. Table 7 shows that, when
ranked according to their total movie consumption, the top 20% of respondents have a very high displacement
rate: one unpaid first viewing displaces 0.56 units of paid consumption while this figure is 0.037 for the bottom
80% of respondents. In addition, Table 8 documents that the same 20% of respondents also account for the
majority of unpaid movie viewings. Since lost sales are calculated as the product of the displacement rate and
unpaid viewings, we find that this group of respondents is responsible for 22124.29 out of 23524.02 displaced
movie sales in our sample, a share of 94%.
Table 9 documents lost sales when individuals are grouped according to various other criteria such as gender,
age, education, or interest in movies. We find that men and women have quite similar displacement rates.
However, men are more likely to not pay for a movie, which then also implies a higher displacement of movie
sales. Regarding age we find an inverse U-shaped pattern. Unpaid movie viewings, the estimated displacement
rate, and lost sales are low for minors, increase until reaching a maximum for the group of 18 to 24 year old,
and then decrease again.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we reported estimates of lost movie sales due to movie piracy in Europe. Using an estimation
approach first proposed by Rob and Waldfogel (2007), we found that for a sample representative of the internet
using population in six major European countries one unit of (first) unpaid consumption displaces around 0.42
units of (first) paid consumption. Interestingly, we found evidence of a sampling effect: for movies that are
seen more than twice, first unpaid consumption slightly increases paid second consumption. Since the sampling
effect is very small, the overall effect of unpaid movie consumption on movie sales is clearly negative: during
the time horizon we study, we find that unpaid consumption reduced movie sales by about 4.4%.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides a cross-country comparison of movie piracy
using an identical methodology. Firstly, our estimated displacement rates are quite similar across countries.
Nevertheless, since the share of unpaid movie consumption differ substantially across countries, we also
documented big differences in lost sales across countries. While in Germany only about 1.65% of movie sales
during the sample period were lost due to unpaid consumption this figure is 10.41% for Spain.
Another novel and important is that 94% of lost movie sales are due to the unpaid consumption of only 20%
of consumers with the highest movie consumption. This small group of consumers, firstly, watches a lot more
movies than the normal population, and secondly, is much more willing to substitute paid with unpaid movies.
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Our findings have important implications for copyright policy. We find support for “incomplete displace-
ment,” that is, a displacement rate smaller than one-to-one. This suggests that at least some of the movies that
are consumed without pay would not have otherwise been purchased. This is in line with the view that unpaid
movie consumption may sometimes lead to socially beneficial transactions. Nevertheless, our results show that
lost sales due to movie piracy are substantial. The estimates that we provide can help policy makers to asses the
efficient use of public resources to be spent on copyright enforcement of movies. In particular, since we find that
virtually all the lost sales of movies are due to a very small group of individuals, most damages of movie piracy
could therefore potentially be prevented with well targeted policies. Finally, the big differences in unpaid movie
consumption across EU Member States that we documented in this paper suggest that institutional differences,
especially regarding copyright law and its enforcement, might substantially affect lost sales. To explore this
further is an interesting avenue for future research.
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Table 1: Respondents’ characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N mean sd min max
Gender
Male 28,344 0.501 0.500 0 1
Female 28,344 0.499 0.500 0 1
Age category
14 years old 28,344 0.0174 0.131 0 1
15 years old 28,344 0.0177 0.132 0 1
16 years old 28,344 0.0179 0.132 0 1
17 years old 28,344 0.0178 0.132 0 1
18-24 years old 28,344 0.146 0.353 0 1
25-34 years old 28,344 0.221 0.415 0 1
35-44 years old 28,344 0.213 0.409 0 1
45-54 years old 28,344 0.191 0.393 0 1
55-64 years old 28,344 0.108 0.310 0 1
65-74 years old 28,344 0.0503 0.219 0 1
Interest in movies*
Much lower 28,344 0.0631 0.243 0 1
Lower 28,344 0.159 0.365 0 1
Same 28,344 0.398 0.490 0 1
Higher 28,344 0.272 0.445 0 1
Much higher 28,344 0.108 0.311 0 1
Education
Primary school or none 28,344 0.0154 0.123 0 1
Lower secondary education / intermediate qualification 28,344 0.160 0.366 0 1
Upper secondary education / full maturity certificate 28,344 0.311 0.463 0 1
Further education (diploma, certificate etc) 28,344 0.175 0.380 0 1
Higher education (university bachelor, master, PhD) 28,344 0.339 0.474 0 1
Working
Yes 28,344 0.578 0.494 0 1
No 28,344 0.422 0.494 0 1
Notes: The table summarizes the respondents’ characteristics. * The question is phrased as “Compared to
other people, how would you describe your interest in films and series?” Weights are applied as described in
Section 3.1.
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Table 3: Mode of second viewings conditional on first viewings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Second viewings
Seen Unpaid Paid Cinema Streaming DVD TV
Seen 25.03% 2.92% 22.11% 1.87% 4.06% 9.65% 6.54%
Paid 25.23% 1.90% 23.33% 1.94% 4.19% 10.41% 6.80%
Cinema 28.68% 2.57% 26.11% 3.18% 4.21% 12.41% 6.31%
Streaming 23.58% 1.87% 21.71% 1.48% 12.55% 4.17% 3.52%
DVD 27.34% 1.86% 25.48% 0.87% 2.04% 18.91% 3.65%
TV 17.85% 0.76% 17.08% 1.12% 1.06% 1.84% 13.06%
Unpaid 23.41% 11.35% 12.06% 1.28% 2.98% 3.36% 4.44%
Notes: The table reports the mode of second viewing of a movie (columns) conditional
on first viewing (rows). Weights are applied as described in Section 3.1.
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Table 7: Longitudinal regressions by movie consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First paid viewings Second paid viewings
1st to 4th 5th 1st to 4th 5th
quintile quintile quintile quintile
1st unpaid -0.153*** -0.566*** 0.115*** 0.00769
(0.0143) (0.0166) (0.00726) (0.0133)
2nd unpaid -0.110*** -0.264***
(0.0135) (0.0221)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Vintage fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 68,832 16,200 68,832 16,200
Individuals 22,944 5,400 22,944 5,400
R-squared 0.005 0.151 0.009 0.018
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of unpaid movie consumption
on paid movie consumption for individuals in the 1st to 4th and 5th quintile of
total movie consumption. Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of unpaid first
viewings on paid first viewings. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of unpaid
first and second viewings on paid second viewings. All specifications include
individual- and vintage fixed effects. The method of estimation is weighted
least squares. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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